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-1. Introduction 
The problem of selecting the best of k = 2 or 3 players in a 
tournament from a ranking and selection point of view is considered 
when only independent win or lose binary comparisons (or games) are 
allowed. Some earlier literature on this subject is described in 
David's monograph [5]. Our main emphasis is on a "Drop the Loser" 
(DL) sampling rule: For three players, this rule states that the 
loser of any game is the one that does not play in the very next 
game. This DL-sampling rule is regarded as a 3-player binary-compari-
sons analogue of the Play-the-Winner (PW) rule that has been considered 
by Robbins [9], [10], Isbell [5] and Smith and Pyle [11] for the 
2-armed bandit problem and by Zelen [12] for the same problem in the 
context of clinical trials. We consider some inverse sampling rules 
with and without early elimination of non-contenders and attempt to 
compare our results with tliose of other new sequential procedures. 
Roughly speaking, under our formulation we want a procedure R 
which has a high probability of a correct selection P{CS; R} when 
one of the players is sufficiently better than the others. Let 
p1 , p2 , and p3 
denote the single-game probability that A beats B, 
B beats C, and C beats A, respectively, and let q. = 1 - p. 
1 1 
* (i = 1, 2, 3). Let p0 (which we also write as p below) and P 
* denote specified constants with ~<Po < 1 and 1/3 < P < 1. 
we define A to be the best player if and only if min(p1 , q3) > ~-
Although it is possible under this definition that none of the players 
is best, we assume that there are only 3 possible decisions available 
to us, i.e., one of the players has to be selected and declared the 
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best player. We would like to have a procedure R such that for 
any specified p0 > \ * and any specified P < 1 
(1.1) * P{CS; R} = P{selecting A; R} ~ P whenever min(p1 , q3) ~ p0 , 
regardless of the value of here is regarded as a nuisance 
parameter and below it is also denoted by e. 
Some of our procedures (see~' RE, and RS below) do not satisfy 
(1.1) and we need a weaker form of (1.1). Suppose we only want (1.1) 
to hold for specific values of 0 and for p0 > E. > \, where E. = J?.(0) 
may depend on 0 and on the procedure R. The function £(0) is 
given explicitly in (3.9) for procedure ¾; the same expression holds 
for procedures ¾ and RS also. 
Taking A as the best player with min(p1 , q3) > p0 and. e fixed, 
we define a least favorable LF 0 configuration with e fixed to be 
one in with For procedure R1 a proof is given by 
N. Elliott and Y. S. Lin in Appendix B that the configuration (p1 =_43 = p0) 
is least favorable for fixed e in the usual sense of minimizing the 
P{CS; ¾l over all triples (p1 , p2 , p~) with min(p1 , q3) ~ Po and 
fixed p2 = e. 
For the procedures studied we shall also be concerned with the 
expected number of games required to reach a decision as a function of 
* P, p , and a; we denote this by E{NILF 0}. 
Since we do not assume the Bradley-Terry Model [3] it is possible 
to have A preferred to B, B preferred to C, and C preferred 
to A (i.e., P1 > \, P2 > %, and P3 > \) but such triads will not 
be in the zone of preference for -selection for any of the three players. 
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In the present discussion we will not consider treating the 3-player 
problem as a succession of 2-player problems; that is, we do not 
consider testing player A against B until one is found to be 
better and then testing C against the better of A and B. The 
present paper is not meant to be an exhaustive study of the 3-player 
problem or a search for an optimal procedure. Rather we have analyzed 
several new procedures {the simpler ones being generally less efficient) 
and made some efficiency comparisons. 
In Section 2 we summarize results for two different 2-player pro-
cedures. In Section 3 we analyze the inverse sampling procedure ~ 
for 3 players {without early elimination of non-contenders) in which 
the first player to win r games is selected as the winner of the 
tournament. Exact recurrence relations are derived for the P{CS; ¾} 
and E{N; ~}, conditional on the number of wins already obtained by 
each player. This Markovian character is then exploited to obtain 
exact numerical values for the P{cstLF9} and E{NILF8} for different 
values of p, 9, and r; the Bradley-Terry model is represented by 
the special case a=\. 
2. The 2-Player Problem 
In the case of 2 contestants all of our procedures can be analyzed 
exactly and explicit expressions can be derived for the P(CS} and 
E{N} functions; we give these results without derivation. In the. 
case of 2 players, one of our procedures(~) occurs in [4] and another 
procedure (RS) occurs in the work of K. Alam [l]; both of these papers 
deal with the analogous binomial and multinomial ranking problems. Special 
cases of our formulas and a discussion of these same two rules 8i 
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and RS for the 2-player problem are also given by Kemeny and Snell 
(7 - p. 165]. 
Let p > \ denote the single-game probability that A beats 
B, so that A denotes the better player. We consider three pro-
cedures for selecting the better player. 
(1) The first is a single-stage procedure ~ in which an odd 
number n = 2m + 1 of games are played and the winner of a majority 
of the games is selected as the better player. 
(2) The second is an inverse sampling procedure ~ in which the 
first player to win r games is selected as the better player. 
(3) The third is a sequential procedure RS in which the first 
player to win d more games than his opponent is selected as the 
better player. 
For the single-stage procedure 1)-, the probability of a 
correct selection is clearly 
(2.1) P{CS; ~} = 
2m+l ~ (2m+l) j 2m+l-j 
I.., j p q = 
j=m+l 
I (mt-1, m+l), p 
where I (a, b) is the usual incomplete beta function. These p 
tournaments need only be continued until one player wins m + 1 
games and then it becomes identical with inverse sampling if we 
equate r and m + 1. 
Under the inverse sampling procedure ¾ we have 
(2.2) 
since, for a correct selection, A wins r games and B wins 
j < r games. The expected number of games in a tournament under 
inverse sampling is 
-
i 
'-' 
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(2.3) 
r ( r 
= - I r+l, r) + - I (r+l, r). p p. q q 
The expected number WL of games won by the loser of the tournament 
is 
(2.4) 
The sequential procedure RS can be regarded as a gambler's ruin 
problem and we easily obtain for w = p/q 
(2.5) 
The expected number of games is given by 
(2.6) 
for * J 1 and equals 2 d for w = 1. The expected number of games WL 
won by the loser is given by 
(2.7) 
for v ¢ 1 and equals d(d-1)/2 for w = 1. 
Table 1A contains a summary of analytically-obtained results 
for the 2-player inverse sampling procedure ~ giving the value of 
* * r = m + 1 as a function of p and P for P = .75, .90, .95, and 
• 99. Table lB contains comparable values of d and E {N; RS } for 
the sequential procedure RS. The d-value in the table is actually 
the smallest integer ~O where d0 is the solution obtained by 
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setting (2.5) equal to * p , i.e. 
(2.8) * p do= {ln{~)}/ln v; 
1-P 
as a result of using the smallest integer ~ d0 , the tabulated values 
of E{N; R8} are not sm:>oth. 
3. Inverse Sampling Procedure ~ for 3 Players. 
The procedure ¾ consists of a sampling rule, a stopping rule 
and a decision rule; it is convenient to combine the latter two. 
Sampling Rule of Procedure~: At the outset randomize between the 
three possible games (Av. B, B v. C, and C v. A), giving probability 
1/3 to each. To determine who plays in succeeding games we use the 
DL-sampling rule, i.e., the loser of any game sits out the next game. 
Stopping and Decision Rule of Procedure !r= Stop as soon as any one 
player has a total of r wins and select him as the best player. 
Probability of a Correct Selection PfCS; !:£]• 
Let WA denote the number of games won by A and let wl = r - wA; 
we define WB ' we, and w' similarly and use w' to denote the 
' 
WB' C 
-
vector ( I I I ) wA, wB, we • Let "wt" denote "wins the tournament" and let 
"PNG=" denote "the players of the next game are." Let 
Rk, = P{A wtlW'= (k, m, n) and PNG =Av B} m, n -
{3.1) sk, = P{A wtlW'= (k, m, n) and PNG = B v C} m, n -
Tk, = P{A wtlW'= {k, m, n) and PNG = C v A}, m, n -
where the procedure ~ is understood. From the DL-sampling rule 
we obtain the recursive relations 
~ 
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R.. = p T + q S 
-ic,m,n 1 k-1,m,n 1 k, m-1,n 
(3.2) S = p R.. + q T k,m,n 2 -ic,m-1,n 2 k,m,n-1 
T = p S + q R.. k,m,n 3 k,m,n-1 3 --ic-1,m,n 
and from the stopping rule we obtain the boundary conditions: for all 
psoitive k, m, n 
(3.3) R = T = 1 O,m,n O,m,n 
R.. = S = S = T = 0 
-1c,O,n k,O,n k,m,O k,m,O 
We have solved (3.2) numerically and calculated A 
r,r,r 
defined by 
(3.4) A = l(R + S + T ), 
r,r,r 3 r,r,r r,r,r r,r,r 
which gives the exact P(CS; ~} for procedure ~. This was done for 
the LF(0) configuration, i.e., 
(3.5) 
for 
which 
P1 = q3 = p (say) 
p = 8 2 
* r = 1(1) min (40, r ), where 
P{CS; RI}> .99. 
r 
½<P$1 
½ < as 1, 
* is the smallest value of 
Expected Number of Comparisons E(N; ~J. 
For E(N; RI} we use a technique similar to the above. Let 
Fk = E(Nlw' = (k, m, n) and PNG =Av B) , ,m,n 
-
(3.6) G k,m,n = E(NI!!_' = (k, m, n} and PNG = B v C) 
H = E{NIW' = (k, m, n) and PNG = C v A} k,m,n 
-
r for 
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From the DL-sampling rule we have 
F = k,m,n pH +q G +l 1 k-1,m,n 1 k,m-1,n 
(3.7) Gk,m,n = p F +q H +1 2 k,m-1,n 2 k,m,n-1 
H = k,m,n p G +q F +1 3 k,m,n-1 3 k-1,m,n 
with boundary conditions F = G = H. = 0 k,m,n k,m,n 7c,m,n if any one index 
is zero. Table 4 gives the value of r and E(N;RI} for configurations 
* corresponding to P = .75, .90, .95, and .99, where E(N; ¾} is 
calculated by 
(3.8) E(N; RI} 1 = -(F + G + H ). 3 r,r,r r,r,r r,r,r 
Limitations of the Procedure RI. 
Due to the fact that the procedure RI depends only on the total 
number of wins for each player an inefficiency arises which is affected 
by the sampling rule used. For certain points in the parameter space 
where A is the best player, the P{CS}, under the sampling rule of 
Procedure R1 , does not approach 1 as the number of games grows indefinitely. 
For procedure RI we delineate these parameter points explicitly. Since 
our result depends only on the sampling rule and the statistic used 
(the total number of wins for each player), the same result also holds 
for procedures ~ and RS defined below. For the configuration (3.5), 
our result states that under the DL-sampling rule for the 
to approach 1 we need 
(3.9) P > ½(-e + Je2 + 4e) 
P(cs} 
and under the vector-at-a-time sampling rule, which giveseach player an 
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equal number of games with each of the other players, we need 
(3.10) 1 p > 3(1 + 8). 
We note that the line in (3.10) is tangent to the curve in (3.9) at 
8 = ½ and hence any pair (p, 8) satisfying (3.10) also satisfies 
(3.9); this is an indication of the improvement obtained by using the 
DL-sampling rule. 
fAB 
£BC 
(3 .11) 
To derive (3.1) consider the first m games for large m and let 
denote the proportion in which we find Av B playing; define 
and £CA similarly. Then under the DL-sampling rule 
fAB = fBC e + fAC q3 
£BC = fAB ql + fAC P3' 
and hence 
(3.12) fAB(l - Sql) = fAC(q3 + ep3) . 
After a large number of games the proportion in which we find A 
playing is given by the two expressions 
(3.13) £AB+ £AC = £AB pl+ fAC q3 + £Be· 
From (3.13) and the identity fBC = 1 - £AB - £AC' we obtain 
(3.14) fAB(2 - pl)+ fAC(2 - q3) = 1 • 
Solving (3.12) and (3.14) gives 
(3.15) fAB = (q3 + P38)/D, £AC= (1 - q10)/D 
where D = 2 + q1q3 
+ 8(p
3 
- q1 ). It follows that the long-term 
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frequencies of wins for A, B and C, resp., under the DL-sampling 
rule are-
qJ(l +pl)+ 8(p3 - ql) 
fA = = p(l + p) D 2 + pq 
qlq3 + 8(ql + P3) q(p + 28) (3.16) fB = D = 2 + pq 
= q(p + 2 - 20) 
2 + pq , 
where the last expressions in (3.16) are for configuration (3.5). The 
condition that fA > Max(fB, fc) is that 
(3.17) 
For configuration (3.5) this reduces to p2 > q8, which easily reduces 
to (3.9). 
A corresponding analysis for Vector-at-a-time sampling states that 
after m vectors for the P(CS) to approach 1 as m- oo we need 
(3.18) 
For the configuration (3.5) this reduces to (3.10). 
We note that for the right members of (3.9) and (3.10) are both 
increasing in 8 and equal (J5 - 1)/2 = .618 ••• and 2/3 respectively 
for 8 = 1. This indicates that for p > (,/5 - 1)/2 under the 
DL-sampling rule the P(CS) - 1 regardless of how close 8 is to 
1 and a similar statement holds for p > 2/3 under the Vector-at-
a-time sampling rule. 
4. Bounds and Approximations for Inverse Sampling. 
\a.I 
... 
,, I 
In this section an upper bound and approximation for both P(csltF) ~ 
and E{NILF) are derived for procedure ~- Lower bounds for the P(cslLF} 
can also be found but these do not appear to be as useful, and will not be 
discussed. 
i 
'-' 
i 
~ 
-- 11 -
Our derivation of an upper bound is based on a lemma (or three 
problems) dealing with the number M = M(r, n) of ways of removing 
r items from an ordered set of n items (0 ~ r :5 n) so that the 
resulting r + 1 groups thus formed by the items remaining all have 
a preassigned parity; here empty groups are taken into account and 
their parity is, of course, even. 
Lemma: The number M of combinations of r items which (when removed) 
result in all r + 1 groups being even is given by 
(4.1) (
n;r) 
M= 
r I 
and M = 0 otherwise. 
if n + r 2 is an integer, 
In the above, if we specify that the 
removed must be the last of the n ordered items, then 
(4.2) M = 2 if ( !!±!. - ) n + r 2 is an integer, 
r - 1 
and M=O otherwise. In addition to the 
want the first group to be odd and all the 
M = c+r3) {4.3) if n+ r - 3 is 
r - 1 2 
and M = 0 otherwise. 
Proof: In the first problem let x. > 0 
l. -
latter condition, 
others even, then 
an integer, 
(i = 1, 2, ••• , r+l) 
th 
r item 
if we 
denote 
the even group sizes, so that x1 + x2 + ••• + xr+l = n - r. Setting 
xi= 2yi, we obtain the equivalent problem of finding non-negative 
integer solutions of y1 + y2 + ••• + Yr+l = {n-r)/2. Setting zi =Yi+ 1 
gives another equivalent problem of finding positive integer solutions 
of z1 + z2 + ••• + zr+l = r + 1 + {n-r)/2. Hence the answer to our first 
problem is simply the number of ways of selecting r different spaces 
- 12 -
from the interior spaces formed by 1 + {n+r)/2 ordered items, i.e., 
the combinatorial in (4.1). If {n+r)/2 is not an integer there are 
no solutions. 
In the second problem we use the same argument except that there 
are only r quantities xi. In the third problem we set x1 = 2y1 + 1 
and xi= 2yi for i > 1; the remainder of the proof is the same. This 11a1 
proves the lemma. 
We now use the symbol A to denote the best of the three players 
and we let n denote the number of comparisons needed under the DL 
sampling rule for A to obtain r wins. Let P (A) 
n 
denote the prob-
ability that A obtains r wins on precisely the nth game given 
that A plays in the first game and the DL sampling rule is used; 
let P (A) denote the same except that A does not play in the first 
n 
game. Of course, waiting for A {the best player) to obtain r wins 
is not a procedure; we refer'to it as a 'pseudo-procedure'. 
PCS Bounds: From the second problem of the lemma {under the LF con- ~ 
figuration) 
(4.4) 
. and the sum over n-values {r ~ n < 00) is one for all p > o.. Since 
RI can yield wrong results, but the above 'pseudo-procedure' does not, 
we find that 
(4.5) P{C~jA} < 
3r-2 
I: p (A)= pr 
n 
n=r 
I {r, r) p 
where P{CSjA} is the P{CSILF} given that A plays in the first 
game. Similarly using the third problem of the lenuna 
... 
--
(4.6) P{CSIA) < 
- 13 -
3r-2 
~ P (A)= Pr 
n 
n=r 
r-2 
( j+r-1) j ~- 1 q = I (r, r-1). j=O r- p 
From (4.5) and (4.6) we obtain the upper bound UB1 
(4.7) P{CSILF) 2P{CSIA) + P{cslA) < 2IP(r, r) + IP(r, r-1) = . 3 . 3 = UBl • 
It is easy to show that I (r, r) p is an upper bound for UB1 and hence 
also for the P{CSILF); we denote it by UB0 • 
Suppose we get a wrong decision and (say) B wins the tournament. 
Consider only the games that B wins, arranged in order of occurence. 
If B beats C twice in succession (in this subset of B's wins), 
then between these wins A must have lost to C, thus providing one 
factor q for this event. We get another factor q for each game 
that A loses to B. Since B wins r games, the minimum power of 
q is obtained (for example) by alternating the wins of B against C 
and against A. This gives a minimum power of q equal to [r/2], 
i.e., for q-+ 0 
21 (r, r) + I (r, r-1) [r/2 ] (4.8) P{CS ILF) ~ P 3 P + fJ(q ) , 
where [x] denotes the smallest integer> x. 
ASN Bounds: Using the lemma again and the n defined above for the 
'pseudo-procedure' we obtain upper bounds for E{NILF), where N is 
the number of games required by procedure ~- Since n is an upper 
bound on N, we find that if we start with A 
00 
(4.9) E{NIA) ~ pr ~ n 
n=r 
(
n:r - 1) q<I,.-r)/2 = 
r - 1 
r(l+q) 
p 
and if we start without A the result is increased by exactly 1. Hence 
- 14 - ~ 
(4.10) 4..,/ 
,,., 
A slight improvement on {4.10) is obtained by using the curtailed ~ 
distribution of n, i.e., by concentrating at n = 3r - 2 all the 
probability for n :=: 3r - 2. We give this upper bound 
(4.11) E(NILF} < 3r - 2 - ~3 ((r-l)I {r, r) - qr I (r+l, r-1)} - p p p 
- -3
1 ((2r-3)I {r, r-1) - 2rq I {r+l, r-2)} p p p 
without derivation since the improvement on (4.10) is usually quite 
small in most cases of interest. 
An Improved Upper Bound for the P{CSILF}: We now use the fact that, 
even if we condition on the best player (say, A) obtaining his ·rth 
win on exactly the j th trial, half of the games that A does not win, 
i.e., [j-~+l] games, are independent binomial contests between B and 
C with single-game probabilities of winning 9 and 1 - 9, respectively, 
under the LF configuration (3.5). 
An improved upper bound for the P{CSjLF} is then obtained by 
distributing A's losses equally between B and C giving the extra 
one to (say) B when the number is odd. Starting with A as one of 
the players and using (4.2), we let i = (j-r)/2 and obtain for r :=: 3 
(4.12) 
r-1 
P{CSjA} ~ pr E (i+r-l)qi 
. 0 r-1 l.= 
r-1-[½] 
E ( i) 0t • 
-[3i+3 a e (1-0)1.-a 
O!- ~~] 2 -r 
r-1 
E = I (r, r) - pr p 
i=[2;+2] 
( i+r-1) i 
r-1 q 
X {I e( [2r-!+l] ,. [ 3i-~r+2]) + I l-S ( [ 2r;i], [ 3i-~r+ 3])) • 
-
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Similarly, starting without A and using (4.3), we obtain for r > 3 
(4 .13) P{CSIA) < I (r, r-1) - pr 
- p 
r-2 
I:: 
i=[2r] 
3 
( i+r-1) i r-1 q 
X {I9([2r-!+1], [3i-~r+4]) + 11_9([2~-i], [3i-~r+5])), 
where the sum in (4.13) vanishes for r = 3. Combining (4.12) and 
(4.13) we obtain the desired bound 
r 
(4.14) P{CSILF) :'.5 UBl - ; (2I::l + E2) = UB2, 
where r:1 and ~ are the sums in (4.12) and (4.13), respectively. 
For 9 = 1 this reduces to 
(4.15) I 1 ( 2r+2 ) ( 2r ) P{CS LF, 9 = l} :'.5 3{2Ip r, [-3-] + Ip r, [3 ] ). 
Approximations for the P(CS} and ASN: From the large-sample analysis 
of Section 3 we also obtain another approximation for the PCS which 
has the same region (see(3.9))of convergence to one for r ~ ~ as the 
exact P{CS) under the DL-rule. We make use of an identity derived 
in [ 8] and utilized in [ 4] between a sum of multinomial probabilities 
and a Dirichlet integral; the final result is adjusted because successive 
observations in the limiting multinomial are not independent under the 
DL-rule. This derivation has some intrinsic interest since it gives a 
method for applying the results of independent sampling to the corre-
sponding problem with correlated sampling • 
The marginal distribution of the vector (of zeroes and a single one) 
which shows the player that won the j th game for j large is that of 
a 3-cell multinomial with the 3 cell probabilities given by (3.16). 
- 16 -
Suppose first that the observations are all ·mutually independent and 
let s denote the number of such multinomial observations needed for 
* a corresponding P -condition; later we make an adjustment for the lack 
of independence between successive observations under the DL-rule. If 
we had independent multinomial vector observations then we can use the 
identity in Theorem 2.4 of [ 8 ] (see also (4.3) of [ 4 J) with k = 3 
and N = s and the P{CS} would then be given by the Dirichlet integral 
(4.16) -- r(3s) too Joo xs-lys-1 dxdy Ib (s, s; 3s) 
,c r3(s) C (1+x+y)3S 
where b = P{WB)/P(WA) = q(p+28)/p(l+p) and c = P(Wc)/P(WA) = 
q(p+2-29)/p(l+p). Integrating by parts in (4.16), we note that two 
arguments of the I-function get lowered and by iteration this easily 
leads to 
(4.17) lb ( s, s; 3s) 
,c 
( 1 ·)s 
= l+b 
s-1 1 . b . 
I:: ( s - + J ) (-) J. t: ' ) 
1 l+b I:.l+b (S+j, S • • Q S-J= l+b+c 
If we divide by the sum of the coefficients of the I functions in 
(4.17),then we can treat the sum in (4.17) as an average of incomplete 
beta functions. If we use the identity found in (4.5), let n-!' denote 
i 1 . · th 1· ·t d t .(il ·c· 1) c· · 1) asymptot c equa 1ty in e 1m1 s - oo an se J .= J J- ••• J-1+ , 
it is easy to show that for i > 0 
(4.18) s(i)biI 1 (s+i, s-i) - s{i)bi. 
l+b 
From this it follows for s - oo that the variance of j/s goes to zero, 
hence we can set j/s equal to b (or j equal to sb) in the 
I-functions in (4.17). This gives us the desired asymptotic result 
i I 
\ ·' 
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(4.19) 
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Ib,c(s, s; 3s) - I 1 (s, s) 
l+b 
I l~b (s(l+b), s). 
l+b+c 
The first and second I-function,respectively,on the RHS of (4.19) 
converge to 1 if and only if p2 > q8 as in (3.9) and if and only 
if p2 > q(l-9), where the latter is implied by the former for 9 > 1/2. 
In fact for 9 close to 1 we can neglect the second I-function since 
it is much closer to 1 than the first. 
) * 1 * We set the right side of (4.19 equal to a specified P (3 < P < 1) 
and solve for s (not necessarily an integer). This constitutes an 
approximate solution for the problem in [4] with independent sampling. 
We now consider the question of adjusting this s-value to obtain 
the r-value required by the DL-rule where successive observations are 
correlated. We associate with the P{CS} under procedure~ the 
r 
.th 
statistic s = I: X1/r where x. = 1 if A wins the 1. game and 
i=l 1. 
.th 0 if A loses or does not play in the l. game. We want the statistic 
S to have the same precision (or variance) under the DL-rule as under 
independent sampling. Using (3.16) we find that in the asymptotic multi-
nomial 
(4.20) 
p2 (l+p) _ (p(l+p))2 
= 2+pq 2+pq = f 
2pq(l+p)2/(2+pq)2 2 
Similarly we can show for each j that in the asymptotic multinomial 
p • = p (X., X ·+.) = (-q) j-1 2£ • 
J 1. 1. J 
A general proof of (4.21) can be obtained by using the second result 
in the lemma proved above, and the identity 
(4.22) 
- 18 -
(j-a)(.i...)a = 1-(-q)j+l 
a 2 l+q p 
(j = 0, 1, 2, ••• ) 
proved in Appendix A. Hence the variance of S {if the counnon variance 
of each X. is cr2) is asymptotically {r ~ oo) given by 
1. 
(4.23) 
cr2/s 
(4 .2'f) 
cr2 
cr2(s) = - {r + 2{r-l)p 1 + 2{r-2)p2 + ••• + 2pr_1) r2 
= cr2 {r + {r-l)p-t-2)pq + ••• + p(-q)r-2 ) 
~2 
2cr2 
r( l+q) • 
To attain the same precision we set the last expression equal to 
obtaining the desired adjustment 
2a 
r = l+q, 
where s is the solution obtained by setting the right side of {4.19) 
* equal to P. In this case>we would take the nearest integer to th 0 
r-value obtained by (4.24); some numerical values based on (4.19), (4.24) 
given in Table 2. 
Examination of the computer output shows that E{NjLF) is very 
closely approximated by 
(4.25) E{NjLF) =Cr+ D. 
Values of C and D are given in Table 3 for .60 ~ p ~ .85 for 
appropriate values of e. For p > .85, C is very close to the upper 
bound value {l+q)/p and D is very close to l/3. In all cases 
(4.25) differs from the exact value by no more than 1. 
are 
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TABLE 2: Numerical Illustrations of Approximations, Exact Values and 
Bounds on r for p = 0.75. (Procedure RI) 
* * p = 0.90 p = 0.95 
e = 0.50 e = 0.75 e = 1.00 e = 0.50 e = 0.75 
Approximation 
Based on (4.19),(4.2~ 8 9 13 11 13 
Exact Values 7 9 14 10 13 
Lower Bounds on r 
Based on (4.14) 7 7 11 8 10 
Based on (4.7) 5 5 5 6 6 
TABLE 3: Values of C and D for use in (4.25). (Procedure RI) 
p e C D 
.60 .50 2.40 -3. 7 
.50 2.13 -1.62 
.65 .75 2.11 -2.19 
.50 1.88 - .40 
.70 .75 1.89 - .92 
1.00 1.89 -1.88 
.50 1.67 .16 
.75 .75 1.68 - .10 
1.00 1.70 - • 70 
.50 1.50 .31 
.Bo .75 1.50 .24 
1.00 1.51 .04 
.50 1.35 .33 
.85 .75 1.35 .33 
1.00 1.34 .29 
e = 1.00 
22 
23 
17 
6 
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5. Inverse Sampling with Elimination: Procedure~-
For 3 players we develop a Markovian procedure ¾: based on inverse 
sampling and the DL-rule which eliminates one of the three players at 
or before the tournament is terminated. As in the case of R1 the 
recurrence formulae provide an algorithm for obtaining exact answers 
for the P{CSILF} and E(NILF}. By building up a table of these functions 
with P(CSILF}-values increasing to one, we can find the specific pro-
* cedure satisfying any given P -condition and the associated E{NILF)-
value. 
At the outset we use randomization and play Av B, B v C or 
C v A each with probability l/3. The DL-rule is used for sampling and 
we eliminate any player as soon as he accumulates a total of r losses. 
The remaining player is then declared the winner. 
When there is no confusion we refer to A as the best player. Let 
LA, LB and LC denote the number of losses of A, B and C, respectively; 
let L' A = r - LA' L' B = r - LB and L' C = r - LC. In analogy with (3.10) 
we define 
(5.1) R. = P(A wins the tournamentlLA' = k, L' = m, Le'= n and 
-1c,m,n B 
the next game is Av B) 
and similarly s k,m,n for B V C and T k,m,n 
DL sampling rule we obtain 
¾,m,n = p T + 1 k,m-1,n q s 1 k-1,m,n 
(5.2) s k,m,n = P1\: + 2 ,m,n-1 q T 2 k,m-1,n 
T k,m,n = p s + 3 k-1,m,n qR 3 k,m,n-1 
for C v A. From the 
\ i 
\ 
~ 
\ I 
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\ I 
\ I 
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-
-
and from the elimination rule we obtain the "boundary" conditions 
._ 
s = o, O,m,n 
_. ¾,m,O = V (say), k,m 
(5.3) T k,O,n = V k,n (say), 
-
uk,O = vk,O = 1, 
- u0 = v0 = O. ,m ,n 
.... 
After player C is eliminated we use the recurrence formula 
'- (5.4) Uk,m = pluk,m-1 + qlUk-1,m 
~ and after player B is eliminated we use 
~ (5.5) Vk,m = P3Vk,n-l + q3Vk-1,n· 
-
After solving these equations we calculated PCS(r) given by 
... 
(5.6) PCS(r) 1 = - (R + S + T ) 3 r,r,r r,r,r r,r,r 
-
which is the exact P(cs} for the procedure RE. This was done for the 
configuration (3.5) for * * r = l(l)min(40,r) where r is the smallest 
-
value of r for which P(CS; ~) > .99. 
For E{N} under procedure ~ we define functions Fk,m,n' 
... Gk and Hk as in (3.6) and write as in (3.7) 
,m,n ,m,n 
~ Fk,m,n = plHk -1 + qlGk-1 + l ,m ,n ,m,n 
.. (5.7) G = p F + q H + 1 k,m,n 2 k,m,n-1 2 k,m-1,n 
~ 
H = p G + q F + 1. k,m,n 3 k-1,m,n 3 k,m,n-1 
-
- 22 -
The boundary conditions assert that Fk ; G and 
,m,n k,m,n H are k,m,n 
equal to 0 if two or more subscripts are zero. Letting 
~,m 
the common value of F = G = H , Y denote the k,m,O k,m,O k,m,O m,n 
common value of F = G = H and O,m,n O,m,n O,m,n z k,n 
common value of Fk O = Gk O = Hk O , we then use , ,n , ,n , ,n 
Xic,m = P1Xic,m-l + ql'Xic-1,m + 1 
(5 .8) y = p2Y 1 + q2Y 1 + 1 m,n m,n- m- ,n 
denote the 
denote 
to complete the algorithm. Solving these equations for the configuration 
(3.5), we then computed 
(5.9) E(N; ~} = l (F + G + H ) 3 r,r,r r,r,r r,r,r 
\ I 
\ ! 
: ' 
\ I 
~ 
\ I 
,._J 
which is the exact value of E{NILF) for procedure R. Table 4§gives 1 ' E ._ 
the values of r and E{N; ~} for the configuration (3.5) corresponding 
* to selected values of p, 8 and P. 
6. Other Sequential Procedures. 
For the purpose of comparison we include a discussion of several 
sequential procedures with Monte Carlo results. In the first one, 
called procedure RS, we used only Monte Carlo methods; in the remaining 
procedures we make use of some theory in (2) for the * P -condition 
and use Monte Carlo methods to estimate the P(cs!LF0} and E(NjLF0 }. 
Let WA, WB and WC denote the number of games won by A, B 
and C, respectively; let the ordered values be denoted by w1 !S w2 ~ w3, 
where ties are clearly possible. For the procedure R8 we use the 
DL-sampling rule and for d > 0 the 
§ Table 4 on page 28. 
'i I 
: I 
) ; 
I I 
' I 
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Stopping Rule for Procedure Terminate as soon as 
and select the player with w
3 
wins as best. 
Monte Carlo results for the LF9 configuration (3.5) were obtained 
for d = 2(2) 10 and selected values of p and a. The proportion 
of successes (PS), i.e. of correct selections, in 1000 tournaments 
is used as an estimate of the P(csjLF9}. The smallest value of d 
for which this estimate exceeds * P is taken as the required minimum 
value needed to satisfy the * P -condition (1.1); these are given in 
Table 4 along with the Monte Carlo estimate N of E(NILF8} for 
selected values of p, 8 and * p • 
For the remaining three sequential procedures we use a common 
notation and make use of the remark on page 14 of [2] that in order 
* for the P -condition (see (3.1.11) in [2]) to hold, it is not necessary 
to take the observations a vector at a time, i.e., to follow the cyclic 
pattern Av B, B v C, C v A. Thus, for example, we can use the same 
result for a procedure ~L which uses the DL sampling rule. This 
result states that if we use a certain likelihood-ratio statistic W 
(to be defined explicitly below) and stop at any point when W 2: p* 
* then the P -condition will be satisfied. All of the three remaining 
procedures have the Wald Stopping Structure (see page 17 of [2]) since 
* they stop as soon as W 2: P and choose among the decision (or 
hypotheses) with maximum likelihood. It should be carefully noted 
that we have only considered the identification aspect of the problem 
since no monotonicity properties have been shown with respect to p or 
8; in other words, if we knew the values of the common p and 8 
* then we can select the best player with the desired value of P. For 
the ranking aspect of this problem we have to show that if the true 
- 24 -
p ~ p0 (the specified value) and the known value of 
the achieved P(CS} will be at least as large as 
e is used, then 
* P ; this has not 
been done. Finally we are interested in the robustness of these procedures 
with respect to 8, i.e., in the values of P(CSjLF8} when e1 is 
used in the statistic W defined below and 9 ~ e1 is the true 
value; this also has not been investigated in this paper. 
To introduce -W, we first define WAB as the number of games in 
which A beat B and similarly for wBA, WAC' WCA, WBC and WcB· 
Six likelihoods are defined for the LF8 configuration (3.5) by 
1ABC 
WAB WBA W W W 
= 
p q e BC(l-9) CBP Ac//CA 
1ACB = 
WAC WC!a W W W p q CB(l-8) BCP ABqWBA 
1 BAC 
WBA WA W W W 
= 
p q B8 AC(l-8) CAP BCq WCB 
(6 .1) w w w w 
1BCA = 
p BC CBS CA( AC WBA W· q 1-9) p q AB 
1
cAB 
WCA WAC W W W W 
= p q 8 AB(l-8) BAP CBq BC 
1
cBA 
WCB WBC W W W W 
= p q 8 BA(l-8) AB CA AC p q . 
The sum of 1ABC and 1ACB represents the "total likelihood" that 
the common p(= pl= q3) is associated with player A, i.e., that A 
is the best player. Hence we further define 
;lA = 1ABC + 1ACB 
(6 .2) t_B = 1 BAC + 1BCA 
ic = 1CAB + 1cBA 
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and the value of W can then be written as 
(6 .3) w = max(£A' ~B' ~c) 
IA+~+ ~c 
For all the three remaining procedures we use the common 
* Stopping and Terminal Decision Rule: Stop as soon as W > P and 
select as the best player 
is the maximum·and 
A if iA 
"f i 
is the maximum (6.3), B if 
C i C * is the maximum. For P > ½ we 
cannot have ties for first place at termination. 1 * 1 For 3 < P < 2 we 
may have ties at termination; if t players are tied for first place 
then we select one by an independent experiment which gives equal 
probability, i.e., 1/t, to each of them. 
It follows that these three procedures differ only in the sampling 
rule. Since ~L uses the DL sampling rule, we need only define the 
sampling rule for the remaining two. 
For the "Double Duty" procedure ~D we use the 
Sampling Rule: Find the two largest L,s and play the corresponding 
two players in the next game. In the case of ties and at the outset we 
use the appropriate randomization, ie.e., we use½ when two are tied 
for 1st. or 2nd. place and 1/3 when there is a triple tie. 
For procedure ~DR we define 
sl = (X.A + ;(B)/2(iA + tB + tC), 
(6 .4) s2 = ( .tB + ~c)/2( tA + ~ + Le>• 
s3 = (iC + ~)/2(iA + /B + ~), 
which add to one and use the 
- 26 -
Sampling Rule: Randomize by taking a uniform deviate U (0 :SU< 1) 
and play Av B if O < U < s1 , play B v C if s1 < U < s1 + s2 , 
and play C v A if s1 + s2 < U < 1. 
Procedures ~D and ~DR eliminate noncontenders in a more 
natural way by gradually lowering the probability of putting them 
into the next game rather than by a sudden complete withdrawal from 
the tournament. 
Evaluation of Monte Carlo Results: 
The Monte Carlo PS results based on 300 tournaments in Table 4 
for the last three sequential procedures ~L' ~DR and ~D indicate 
that the nominal * P -value is satisfied since the observed PS value 
* went below P in only 8 of the 252 cases (or 3%) and the maximum error 
is .017. For large values of p (say .95), all the procedures have 
their E(NjLF8 ) (~r N values) approximately equal and there is not 
much practical basis for using this as a criterion for choosing one 
of them. For smaller values of p (say, .65 to .75),; the differences 
are substantial. If we look at the maximum over the three values of 6 
studied for each p, then procedure 8nn shows a reduction of as 
much as 50% when compared to the results of procedure RI for some 
values of p and * p . In general, the results for procedure ~D 
appear to be better, if we look at the maximum over three values of 
e, then any of the other procedures considered. 
In the absence of any information about e, it might be desirable 
to use a closer net of a-values and find the value of 8 which maximizes 
N and treat the problem as if that were the true value of a. A more 
practical approach might be to use the accumulated observations to 
estimate 0 but this has not been considered in this paper. 
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It is also interesting to note that the value of the statistic 
W (defined in {6.3) above) at termination is another estimate of the 
P(cs!LF9}; the theoretical basis for this is discussed in Section 3.2 
of [2]. Monte Carlo values of W averaged over 300 experiments are 
denoted by W and given for Procedure ~D in Table 4. 
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TABLE 4: 3 Players Problem. Comparison of E{NILF9a) values (exact and estimated) 
p e 
.50 
.65 .75 
1.00 
.50 
070 .75 
1.00 
.50 
.75 .75 
1.00 
.50 
.80 .75 
1.00 
.50 
.85 .75 
1.00 
.50 
.90 .75 
1.00 
.50 
.95 .75 
1.00 
for six procedures (the r and d values are needed to make the associated 
procedure explicit; PS and N are Monte Carlo (MC) estimates of the 
P{cslLfe} and E{NjLF8} based on 300 and 600 tournaments, respectively). 
* P = .75 
R1 (exact) ¾ (exact) RS (MC) ~L (MC) 1¾>oR (MC) ~D (:t-JC) 
~ d§ - - -E(NjLFe} r E(NILi} r N PS N PS N PS 
17.4 9 18.5 9 15.7 4 17.0 .763 15ol .760 13.5 . 760 
25.3 13 18.4 7 22.5+ 5+ 1602 .733 16.3 .8o6 12.5 .817 
-- # 23.8 9 -- - 10.6 .930 8.1 .883 9°5 0770 
8.4 5 lOoO 4 a.a+ 3+ 9.0 .813 9.7 .803 8.3 0803 
10.2 6 9.9 4 13.4 4 9.8 .823 10.4 0763 7.4 .777 
20.8 12 9°9 4 18.4+ 5+ 7.8 .840 6.8 0817 604 .840 
6.2 4 7.2 3 7.5+ 3+ 6.1 .803 6.6 .820 5.4 .803 
6.1 4 7.2 3 7.6+ 3+ 5.5 .817 6.6 .767 5.7 .850 
7.6 5 7.1 3 7.6+ 3+ 5.9 .870 5.7 .870 4.9 .860 
4.2 3 4.5 2 3.5+ 3+ 2.9 .767 4.o .820 3.1 .797 
4.2 3 4.5 2 3.7 2 2.8 .753 4.4 .787 3.0 0777 
4.1 3 4.5 2 3.6 2 2.8 .747 3.7 .830 3.1 .810 
2.5 2 2.0 1 3.5 2 2.8 .837 3.5 .893 2.6 .853 
2.5 2 2.0 1 3.4 2 2.7 .817 3.6 .807 2.6 .870 
2.5 2 2.0 1 3.4 2 2.7 .830 3.2 .810 2.5 .793 
2.5 2 2.0 1 3.1 2 2.0 .Boo 2.4 .823 2.0 .853 
2.5 2 2.0 1 3.3 2 2.0 .833 2.7 .810 2.0 .853 
2.5 2 2.0 1 3.1 2 2.0 .820 2.8 .830 2.0 .833 
2o4 2 2.0 1 3.0 2 2.0 .910 2.3 .887 2.0 .923 
2.4 2 2.0 1 2.9 2 2.0 .913 2.5 .907 2.0 .927 
2.4 2 2.0 1 2.9 2 2.0 .923 2.8 .930 2.0 .917 
# indicates that the value of r is greater than 40. 
+ indicates values based on linear interpolation in a table of Monte Carlo results. 
§ estimates based on 1000 tournaments 
-w 
.792 
.780 
.813 
.811 
0793 
.801 
.816 
.813 
.830 
.786 
.774 
.8o8 
.833 
.828 
.821 
.845 
.839 
.840 
.919 
.917 
.919 
\ ,' 
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-TABLE 4: continued 
* P = .90 
RI (exact) ~ (exact) RS (MC} 
~L (MC) ~DR (MC) ~D (MC) p 8 
E(NlLF9} r E(NILFe} r 
-§ N d§ N PS N PS N PS w 
.50 41.1 20 54-3 20 30.8 6 30.6 .937 30.9 .890 26.7 .890 .915 
.65 .75 -- # 76.ff 28 54.2+ 9 30.2 .950 30.3 .923 22.9 .923 .913 
1.00 
--
# 65.1 24 
-- -
12.8 1.000 11.6 .973 16.1 .917 .. 923 
.50 20.2 11 23.3 9 17.9+ 5+ 16.5 .910 16.8 .927 14.4 .920 .921 
.70 .75 29.3 16 28.6 11 23.9 6 17.9 .950 19.0 .943 13.8 .903 .918 
1.00 68.o 37 33.9 13 45.3+ 9+ 11.8 .967 10.2 .953 11.2 .943 .932 
.50 11.5 7 14.9 6 11.0 4 9.7 .943 10.8 .920 9.2 .937 .924 
.75 .75 14.9 9 14.6 6 14.8+ 5+ 11.6 .933 12.3 .930 10.2 .963 .933 
1.00 23.0 14 20.0 8 19.0 6 9.5 .970 8.6 .960 8.0 .927 .934 
.50 7.5 5 9.5 4 9.5 4 7.1 .943 7.8 .913 6.5 0 943 .934 
.80 .75 9.0 6 9.5 4 9.3 4 7.8 .923 8.4 .933 6.7 0 927 .937 
1.00 11.9 8 11.9 5 9.8 4 6.3 .953 6.8 .930 5.5 .927 .925 
.50 5.5 4 6.8 3 5.8+ 3+ 5.0 .947 5.4 .947 4.7 .960 .933 
.85 .75 5.5 4 6.8 3 5.6+ 3+ 5.1 .933 5.9 .960 4.6 .917 .927 
1.00 6.8 5 9.1 4 5.6+ + 3 5.5 .963 6.o .963 4.7 .970 .947 
.50 3.8 3 4.3 2 3.1 2 4.2 .957 4.6 .953 3.7 .923 .948 
.90 .75 3.8 3 4.3 2 3.3 2 4.1 .937 4.6 .943 3.7 .957 .941 
1.00 3.8 3 6.6 3 3.1 2 4.2 .953 4.6 .943 3.7 .963 .949 
.50 2.4 2 2.0 1 3.0 2 2.5. .940 3.1 .943 2.5 .967 °954 
... 0 95 .75 2.4 2 2.0 1 2.9 2 2.5 .933 3.4 .943 2.6 .953 .953 
1.00 2.4 2 4·.2 2 2.9 2 2.7 .957 3.1 .950 · 2~4- ·.-:.~33 .946 
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TABLE 4: continued 
* P = .95 
R1 (exact) ~ (exact) RS (MC) 
p 8 
-§ d§ E[NILFe} r E{Nf LF8} r N 
.50 58.0 28 65.1 24 43.0 8 
.65 .75 -- # 84.5 31 -- -
1.00 
--
# 
--
# 
-- -
.50 29.7 16 33.9 13 22.4 6 
.70 .75 46.3 25 36.6 14 41.5 10 
1.00 
--
# 44.6 17 -- -
.50 16.7 10 20.0 8 14.4+ 5+ 
.75 .75 21.7 13 20.0 8 18.4 6 
1.00 38.3 23 22.5 9 27.3 8 
.50 10.6 7 11.9 5 9.5 4 
.80 .75 12.1 8 11.9 5 9.3 4 
1.00 18.1 12 11.9 5 15.2 6 
.50 7.0 5 9.5 4 8.o 4 
.85 .75 8.3 6 9.5 4 5.6+ 3+ 
1.00 9.6 7 9.5 4 7.9 4 
.50 5.1 4 6.6 3 4.7+ 3+ 
.90 .75 5.1 4 6.6 3 5.0+ 3+ 
1.00 5.1 4 6.6 3 4.9+ 3+ 
.50 3.6 3 4.2 2 3.0 2 
.95 .75 3.6 3 4.2 2 2.9 2 
1.00 3.6 3 4·.2 2 2.9 2 
~L (MC) ~DR (MC) 
N PS N PS 
4o.8 .957 38.5 .967 
41.9 .963 40.9 .957 
12.8 1.000 13.2 .997 
22.9 .963 21.5 .970 
24.8 .947 24.9 .963 
12.5 1.000 12.0 .990 
13.1 .963 14.2 .960 
14.9 .963 15.9 .967 
10.5 .953 10.0 .977 
8.6 .973 9.5 .957 
10.3 .970 10.6 .960 
8.9 .977 8.6 .983 
6.3 .973 7.3 .957 
6.8 .977 7.7 .980 
6.o .967 6.6 .973 
4.4 .967 5.0 .957 
4.4 .973 5.3 .973 
5.1 .990 6.1 .983 
3.9 .980 4.o .980 
3.8 .997 4.1 .983 
3.7 .990 4.4 .963 
¾n 
N . 
33.8 
30.8 
21.4 
18.4 
18.6 
13.7 
11.9 
12.0 
9.6 
8.0 
8.7 
7.3 
5.9 
6.1 
5.2 
4.4 
4.2 
4.6 
3.3 
3o3 
3.5 
(MC) 
PS w 
.973 °959 
.973 .957 
.977 .965 
.957 .963 
.953 °959 
.940 .965 
.970 .963 
.970 .962 
.973 .968 
.980 .964 
.953 .968 
.970 °969 
0973 .968 
.983 .971 
.,957 .967 
.977 .969 
.967 .966 
.983 .983 
.983 .979 
.987 .975 
.963 .978 
i I 
I i 
\..J 
I 
la.I 
I ' 
.. 
I ' 
I 
-·-
\ I 
-
I , 
--
1 ' 
\ ; 
I i 
I f 
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TABLE 4: continued 
* P = .99 
R1 (exact) RE (exact) RS (MC) ~L (MC) ~DR (MC) 8nn (MC) p e 
E{NILF0 } r E{NILFe} r 
-§ N d§ N PS N PS N PS w. 
-
.50 
--
# 
--
# 
-- -
60.6 .997 57.0 .997 49.2 .990 .992 
.65 .75 -- # -- # -- - 62.9 .987 59°7 .983 47.9 1.000 .991 
1.00 
--
# 
-- # -- - 12.5 1.000 13.4 1.000 30.3 0 993 0 992 
.50 52.3 28 60.0 23 35.3 9 32.8 .990 33.5 .997 28.7 1.000 .992 
.70 .75 -- # 71.1 27 -- - 39.0 .997 38.2 .997 28.4 .993 .992 
1.00 
--
# 87.0 33 -- - 13.1 1.000 13.6 1.000 18.7 .990 .993 
.50 30.3 18 35.1 14 23.7 8 20.6 .990 19.4 .997 17.6 1.000 .993 
0 75 .75 41.8 25 37.6 15 31.6 10 24.4 .993 24.8 .997 ·18.5 .994 .992 
1.00 
--
# 42.8 17 -- - 12.7 1.000 13.1 1.000 13.5 .997 .994 
.50 18.3 12 21.6 9 14.2 6 13.2 .990 13.8 .990 11.4 .993 .993 
.80 .75 22.8 15 21.6 9 16.8+ 7+ 15.2 .990 16.1 .990 12.4 .990 .993 
1.00 33.3 22 24.o 10 20.8 8 11.5 .990 11.4 .997 9.7 0 997 .994 
.50 11.1 8 13.8 6 9.6+ 5+ 9.3 .993 9.9 .990 8.o .990 .993 
.85 0 75 13.8 10 13.8 6 9.8+ 5+ 9.7 .997 10.9 0 997 9.0 1.000 .994 
1.00 17°9 13 13.7 6 11.8 6 8.4 .997 9.0 1.000 7.6 .997 .993 
.50 7.6 6 8.8 4 6.4 4 6.0 .997 7.0 .993 5.7 .997 .993 
.90 0 75 7.6 6 8.8 4 6.7 4 6.2 .983 7.6 0 993 5.7 .993 .992 
1.00 10.1 8 8.8 4 6.7 4 6.9 .997 8.0 .997 6.o .993 .994 
.50 4.7 4 6.3 3 5.5 4 4.6 1.000 5.4 .997 4.5 0 993 .997 
.95 0 75 4.7 4 6.3 3 5.5 4 4.6 .997 5.8 1.000 4.5 .993 .997 
1.00 5.8 5 6.3 3 5.6 4 4.5 .997 5.6 .997 4.3 1.000 .996 
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APPENDIX A: Proof of the Identity in (4.2a). 
We consider the sum 
(A. l) 
[i] CX) 
F = E (j-o:)xa = E (j-a)xa 
j a:o a a:o a 
where the sum is extended to ex>, since the binomial coefficients are 
zero for a> (j/2]. We define the generating function 
(A.2) F(-s) 
CX> 00 00 • 
= E F.sj = E xa E e-a)sj 
j=O J a:o j=2a a 
CX) 00 
= E (xs2 )a E 
<X=O ~O 
(a+m) m - 00 fxa2)a 0 ,s-E~-
' a.::O ( 1-s fX+l 
= (1 -. s - xs2 f 1. 
But this can be expanded by partial fractions and leads to the final 
result 
(A.3) 1 F j = 21+1 J1'+'4 { (. 1 + J 1+4x) j+ 
1 
- ( 1 - J 1 +4x) j+ 1 } . 
This reduces to (4.22) when x is set equal to q/p2 • 
.._ 
~ 
\ 
'-
--
'1 I 
--
~ 
I.J 
ta.I 
l '. 
-' 
I 
~ 
l..i 
I 
._ 
~ 
'-' 
.... 
..I 
'-' 
~ 
I 
~ 
•. 
-
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APPENDIX B 
The enclosed Table 5 contains two procedures not previously defined 
and two that were. The new procedures are defined so that the decrease (or 
increase) in_ E{NILF9} for ~ compared to 1½:c and for ~L compared 
to RBKS is due solely to the DL-sampling rule. 
Procedure ¾c is an inverse sampling procedure with a cyclic sampling 
pattern, i.e., we start by randomizing (with equal probability) between 
A vs. B, B vs. C and C vs. A and then continue in a cyclic manner with 
these three types of games (in any prescribed order). Using the same 
definitions as in (3.1}, except that we have a new sampling rule, the 
recursion formulas become 
R.. = p s + q s 
-1c, m, n 1 k-1, m, n 1 k, m-1, n 
(B 1) sk, = P2Tk 1 + a_Tk, m, n , m- , n c m, n-1 
Tk, m, n =pR.. l+qR..l • 3--k, m, n- 3-1c-, m, n 
The boundary conditions are the same as in (3.3). [The two essential 
changes to make (B 1) the exact equations for E(N}, namely adding 1 to 
each equation and replacing 1 by O in the boundary conditions, are the same 
as in (3.7) and need not be repeated.] As in Section 3 we are interested 
in {_3.4) and (3 .8). Comparable values of E (N 1LF 0} for procedures RIC and 
* ¾ are given in Table 5 for selected values of (p, 0, P ). The procedure 
~ shows an improvement over ~C in all cases computed and in several 
cases the reduction is as much as 50%. 
The procedure ¾KS samples a vector at a time and hence the observed 
number of games is a multiple of 3 in every tournament. After each set of 
3 games the statistic W in (6.3) is calculated and we stop as soon as 
- 34 -
* W ~ P as in Section 6, the only difference between this procedure and R0L 
being that the latter uses the DL-sampling rule. Except for six cases, 
in each of which e = 1, * p is small and P is moderate (see starred 
entries in Table 5), the procedure ~L shows an improvement over ¾Ks; 
the reduction is less than that observed in the previous comparison but it 
still surpasses 25% reduction in many cases. 
* The proportion of successes (PS) in 300 trials went below P in 
2 out of 64 cases for RBKS' the maximum difference * (P - PS) being 
the 
maximum difference 
* PS-value went below P in 5 out of 64 cases, the 
* (P - PS) being .017. * Since these dips below P 
are easily explainable by chance, we have an empirical verification of 
* the basic P -condition (1.1) and at the same time a numerical study of 
the improvement due only to the DL-sampling rule. 
I .1 
--
I 
~ 
I 
1..1 
' I 
...J 
l_,I ·· 
- 35 -
TABLE 5: Comparison of Procedures for Evaluating the Improvement Arising Only from the 
DL sampling Rule 
-
. 
* * p = .75 p = .90 
e 
1½:c(exact) R1 (exact) RBKS(~) RDL(~) 1½:c(exact) 1½: (exact) ¾Ks(K!) RDL (MC) p 
E {N\LF e} r E {N\LF 8} N N E{NlLF e} r E{NILF 8 J N N 
.50 19.3 9 17.4 18.6 17.0 45.3 20 41.1 39.4 30.6 
.65 .75 41.9 19 25.3 20.2 16.2 --- # --- 36.5 30.2 
* * * * 1.00 
--- # --- 8.7 10.6 --- # --- 10.8 12.8 
.50 11.8 6 8.4 11.8 9.0 25.1 12 20.2 22.9 16.5 
.70 .75 13.8 7 10.2 12.9 9.8 46.3 22 29.3 25.0 17.9 
20.8 * * 68.o * * 1.00 
---
# 7.7 7.8 --- # 10.3 11.8 
.50 7.1 4 6.2 10.8 6.1 15.5 8 11.5 15.0 9.7 
.75 .75 7.1 4 6.1 9.3 5.5 21.4 11 14.9 17.0 11.6 
1.00 18.8 10 7.6 7.5 5.9 69.2 35 23.0 10.9 9.5 
.50 4.9 3 4.2 3.7 2.9 8.9 5 7.5 9.9 7.1 
.Bo .75 4.9 3 4.2 3.8 2.8 12.6 7 9.0 10.1 7.8 
1.00 6.7 4 4.1 3.6 2.8 23.8 13 11.9 7.4 6.3 
.50 2.8 2 2.5 3.4 2.8 6.6 4 5.5 9.2 5.0 
.85 .75 2.8 2 2.5 3.5 2.7 8.4 5 5.5 8.9 5.1 
1.00 2.8 2 2.5 3.5 2.7 11.9 7 6.8 7.4 5.5 
.50 2.8 2 2.5 3.3 2.0 4.7 3 3.8 7.7 4.2 
.90 .75 2.8 2 2.5 3.3 2.0 4.6 3 3.8 7.3 4.1 
1.00 2.8 2 2.5 3.3 2.0 6.2 4 3.8 6.9 4.2 
.50 2.7 2 2.4 3.1 2.0 2.7 2 2.4 3.1 2.5 
.95 .75 2.7 2 2.4 3.1 2.0 2.7 2 2.4 3.2 2.5 
1.00 2.7 2 2.4 3.2 2.0 2.7 2 2.4 3.1 2.7 
* Exceptions to the observed result that the DL-sampling rule reduces N occur only for 
values of 8 near 1. 
# See Table 4. 
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TABLE 5: continued 
* * p =-95 p = .99 
R1C(exact) R1(exact) RBKS (MC) ~L(n; ) R1C( exact ) R1 (exact) RBKS (MC) ~L(MC) 
p 8 
E{N ILF 8 } r E {N ILF e} E{N ILFe} r E {N ILF e} 
- N N N N 
. 50 66.3 29 58.0 50.4 4o.8 --- # --- 70.7 60 .6 
.65 .75 --- # . --- 46.o 41.9 --- # --- 67.7 62 .9 
* * 1.00 --- # --- 11.7 12.8 --- # --- 12.5 12.5 
.50 36 .0 17 29.7 25 . 8 22.9 61.8 29 52.3 41.2 32 .8 
.70 .75 74.4 35 46. 3 33 .0 24 .8 --- # --- 48.6 39.0 
* * 1.00 
--- # --- 11.4 12. 5 --- # --- 13.2 13 .1 
.50 21.6 11 16.7 18.6 13.1 37.7 19 30.3 27.2 20.6 
.75 .75 33 .5 17 21.7 20 .4 14.9 65 .7 33 41.8 32.5 24.4 
1.00 --- # 38.3 11.1 10. 5 --- # --- 13.6 12.7 
. 50 14.6 8 10.6 13.6 8.6 24.1 13 18.3 17.4 13.2 
.80 .75 18.4 10 12 .1 13 .0 10 .3 35 . 3 19 22 .8 20 .2 15.2 
1.00 39.0 21 18.1 10 .6 8. 9 --- # 33.3 12.3 11.5 
. 50 10.2 6 7.0 8.7 6.3 15.6 9 11.1 13.3 9.3 
.85 .75 10.2 6 8.3 9.5 6.8 20.9 12 13.8 14.3 9.7 
1.00 19.0 11 9.6 7.2 6.o 36.8 21 17.9 10.0 8.4 
.50 6. 3 4 5.1 7.5 4.4 11.4 7 7.6 9.7 6.o 
.90 .75 8.1 5 5.1 7.6 4.4 13. 1 8 7.6 9.7 6.2 
1.00 9.6 6 5.1 7.0 5.1 18.1 11 10.1 10.5 6.9 
.50 4. 5 3 3.6 6.7 3.9 7.7 5 4.7 6.7 4.6 
.95 .75 4. 5 3 3.6 6.6 3.8 7.7 5 4. 7 6.7 4.6 
1.00 6.o 4 3. 6 6.7 3.7 9.2 6 5.8 6. 5 4.5 
Let R. , 
-le, m, n 
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APPENDIX C 
by N. Elliott and Y. s. Lin 
University of Minnesota 
sk ' ,m,n T (with all subscripts nonnegative), k,m,n 
be as defined in (3.1) with p1 = 1 - q1 , as 
defined earlier. Using the recursive equations (3.2) and boundary con-
ditions (3.3), we wish to show that the probability of a correct selection 
given by A in (3. 4) is a strictly increasing function of p1 • r,r,r 
Let vN denote the vector (k,m,n) when the sum of the components 
k + m + n equals N; let wN denote another vector with component sum 
N'. We say that vN majorizes wN, (written vN)-wN') if 
(c 1) k' ~ k, m' ~ m, n' ~ n and N' ~ N. 
Let v denote a generic symbol for all three functions, R, S and T. 
(c 2) wk,m,n ~ wk' ,m' ,n'. 
Proof. We need only consider N > 3 and k,m' ,n' all positive since the 
proof is trivial otherwise. To complete the induction proof, for example 
for '¥ = R, we use (3. 2) to write 
and the result therefore holds for N if it holds for N - 1. A similar 
proof holds for w = S and W = T. 
Lemma 2: For all P1, 9, P3 
(c 4) T ;? S k-1,m,n k,m-1,n 
0 
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whenever all subscripts in (C 4) are nonnegative. 
Proof. The result is trivial for k = 1 or m = 1 and we can therefore 
assume that k ~ 2 and m ~ 2. 
If we start with the middle equation of (3. 2) substitute for R 
from the first equation, and then use the second equation again to eliminate 
the new S, we eventually get S as a function of T's k,m-1,n only. 
This result can be written for all m ~ 2 as 
[~] [m-3] 
2 . 2 . 
S - ( 1 - 9) L ( 9q1 ) J T + 9P L { 9q ) J T ] (c 5) k,m-1,n - k,m-l-2j,n-1 1 . 1 k-l,m-2-2j,n' j~ J~ 
where [x] denotes the largest integer less than or equal to x. The sum 
of all the coefficients on the right side of {c 5) is at most one because 
the sum is exactly one in (3. 2) and, at each step in deriving (c 5), we 
replaced a $-function by two terms with coefficients suDm1ing to one. Final 
terms of the form ~k O = 0 are omitted in (c 5) and hence the sum of , 'n 
the coefficients on the right side of (c 5) must be at most one. Since 
vN = {k - 1, m, n) majorizes every vector on the right side of (c 5), it 
follows from leunna 1 that T is greater than {or equal to) every k-1,m,n 
T on the right side of (C 5). Using the fact that the sum of the coefficients 
in (c 5) is at most one, it follows from (c 5) that T ~ S · k-1,m,n k,m-1,n' 
this proves lemma 2. 
Let wk,m,n(MF) correspond to the more favorable configuration in 
which p1 = p + e, p2 = 0 and p3 = p for e > O, and let tk,m,n(LF) 
correspond to the same with e = O. 
Theorem. For all nonnegative k, m, n 
(c 6) 
i / 
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I ! 
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Proof. We can assume k, m, n all positive and N ~ 3 since the proof 
is trivial otherwise. Using (3.2) and the inductive hypothesis 
(c 7) sk (MF)= 0 R. l (MF)+ (1 - e) Tk l(MF) 
,m,n -K,m- ,n ,m,n-
~ 9 R. l (LF) + (1 - e) Tk l(LF) = 
-K,m- ,n ,m,n- sk,m,n(LF)' 
and a similar proof holds for Tk • For R. we obtain 
· ,m,n -K,m,n 
(c 8) R. (MF)= (p + e) Tk l (MF)+ (q - e) sk l (MF) 
-K,m,n - ,m,n ,m- ,n 
~ p Tk l (LF) + q sk l (LF) + e [T (MF) - s. (MF)] 
- ,m,n ,m- ,n k-1,m,n k,m~l,n 
~ R. (LF), 
-K,m,n 
since lemma 2 holds for all configurations; this proves the theorem. 
Corollary. For procedure ¾ with any r 
(c 9) P{cslMF} ~ P(cslLF} • 
Proof. Since the P{CS} under procedure ¾ is given by (3.4) the 
result (c 9) is an imnediate consequence of the theorem above. 
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